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1. Introduction 
The notion of truth has never been far from the ongoing conversation about scientific 
realism. Scientific realism (and its opposition) is often defined explicitly in terms of truth, and 
sometimes it is argued that scientific realism (and its opposition) requires a commitment to 
particular conceptions about the nature of truth. It’s not difficult to appreciate why. The realist 
perspective maintains that science succeeds (or aims at succeeding) in correctly capturing the 
nature of reality, and to correctly describe reality just is to give a true theory about it. While it is 
fairly indisputable that there is some connection between truth and realism, it remains to be seen 
just how deep the relationship goes. In this essay, I explore some of the prominent ways that 
scientific realism and the theory of truth have intersected, and evaluate the arguments that have 
been offered concerning their relationship. 
Two basic positions can be articulated when it comes to the relationship between the 
theory of truth and scientific realism. Those who favor neutrality believe that one’s position on 
the theory of truth is neutral with respect to one’s position on scientific realism, and vice versa. 
Even though realism might be defined in terms of truth, it’s a further (and false) claim that 
realism (or its opposition) must be defined in terms of particular theories of truth. Those who 
favor a partisan view believe that varieties of scientific realism and anti-realism are tied up in the 
nature of truth, such that the former are committed to particular perspectives on truth. Of 
course, whether the neutral or partisan position is correct depends on precisely how one 
understands what realism and truth amount to, and there is no shortage of options in this regard. 
Still, it will be worthwhile to explore why various theorists have or have not found views about 
truth lurking in the debate over scientific realism. 
I take up the neutral and partisan positions in turn in the following two sections. I begin 
by considering the case for neutrality, also offering alongside some basic remarks about the 
various theories of truth at issue. I then evaluate a variety of partisan positions, beginning with 
Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude. I then relate Fine’s views to those of major twentieth-
century partisan figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam, and finally 
consider some more modest, contemporary partisan views. While I do not address the related 
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notions of approximate truth and truthlikeness, they are taken up by G. Schurz, “Truthlikeness 
and approximate truth,” ch. 11 of this volume. 
 
2. Neutrality 
Let’s begin by examining some canonical statements about scientific realism. According 
to Stathis Psillos’s account, the realist “regards mature and predictively successful scientific 
theories as well-confirmed and approximately true of the world” (1999: xvii). The constructive 
empiricist Bas van Fraassen defines his realist opponent as one who subscribes to the thesis that 
“Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and 
acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (1980: 8, emphasis removed). 
Notice how both of these characterizations of scientific realism employ ‘true’. By presenting 
realism as the view that science is ultimately interested in truth, Psillos and van Fraassen suggest 
that realists view science as a guide to learning about reality. There are facts of the matter as to 
what reality is like, and the job of science is to discover and describe those facts. 
Anti-realist views are likewise often defined in terms of truth. Some modest forms of 
anti-realism maintain that science is not interested in the whole truth about reality, but just some 
restricted set of truths. Constructive empiricism maintains that science aims at empirical 
adequacy, i.e., truly describing the observable aspects of reality (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980, and also 
O. Bueno, “Empiricism,” ch. 8 of this volume).  Entity realism maintains that science is a tool 
for discovering the truth about what entities exist, but not facts concerning what those entities 
are like (see e.g. Cartwright 1983, and also M. Egg, “Entity realism,” ch. 10 of this volume). 
Structural realists hold that science is prepared to find the truth about the structure of reality, 
though not its nature (see e.g. Worrall 1989, and also I. Votsis, “Structural realism and its 
variants,” ch. 9 of this volume). More thoroughgoing forms of scientific anti-realism deliberately 
distance themselves from truth. Classic instrumentalism, for instance, is sometimes defined as 
the view that scientific theories are not even in the business of being true, or that their value and 
purpose is in no way related to their truth (e.g., Smart 1968). By contrast, other strong forms of 
scientific anti-realism, perhaps under the spell of Kuhn (1970), deny that the notion of truth 
makes any sense at all, and so the practice and aims of science must be understood without 
reference to truth at all (cf. Rorty 1972). 
The central commitment of the neutral perspective is that the accounts of realism and 
anti-realism that employ truth in the manner described above do not thereby saddle realism and 
its opposition with particular views as to what truth itself is. That is to say, the aforementioned 
statements of realism and anti-realism can be read as not taking an explicit stand as to whether 
“substantive” theories of truth (such as the correspondence theory or coherence theory) or more 
“deflationary” theories of truth (such as disquotationalism and prosententialism) are correct. 
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Substantive theories of truth take the notion of truth to be a robust one worthy of philosophical 
analysis. Such views aim to define truth in terms of its correspondence with reality (e.g., 
Newman 2002), or in terms of a kind of coherence that obtains between all the members of a 
particular set of propositions or beliefs (e.g., Young 2001). Deflationary theorists (e.g., Horwich 
1990) find such elaborate accounts misguided, as for them the principal role for truth to play is 
as a kind of expressive device. The truth predicate enables us to reassert claims made by others 
(“What she said is true”) and make simple generalizations about many claims at once 
(“Everything he said last month is true”). According to deflationists, when one predicates truth 
of, say, the sentence ‘There are electrons’, one is not ascribing to the sentence some complex 
property in need of analysis, but rather just claiming once again that there are electrons. 
Important for our discussion is that the above statements of realism can be neutral with 
respect to the debates between substantive and deflationary theorists. For example, suppose 
realism is as van Fraassen maintains, and that the realist holds that in accepting a scientific theory 
one believes it to be true. A deflationist will point to this thesis as a paradigm instance of the 
utility of the truth predicate. For to say that a scientific theory is true is no more than to say that 
if the theory entails that aardvarks anticipate avalanches, then aardvarks anticipate avalanches, 
and if the theory entails that boa constrictors bustle in Bozeman, then boa constrictors bustle in 
Bozeman, and so on. In calling a scientific theory true, one asserts all of the implications of the 
theory without having to assert each one individually. What one does not do is ascribe some 
particular property (such as “corresponding to the facts”) to the theory. Hence, what it is for a 
theory to be true is that, for all p, if the theory entails that p, then p. By rejecting substantive 
theories of truth, deflationists do not thereby deny that truth has some connection to scientific 
realism. 
Likewise, there is nothing in van Fraassen’s or Psillos’s statements of scientific realism to 
disturb a substantivist about truth such as the correspondence theorist. In fact, substantivists 
about truth can agree with deflationists about the logical and expressive functions of ‘true’. They 
simply go further, adding that what it is for particular implications of the theory to be true is for 
them to stand in a certain relation of correspondence, coherence, or what have you. 
Hence, the neutralist concludes, to define realism in terms of truth is not yet to assign a 
specific theory of truth to any version of scientific realism or anti-realism. (See also Devitt 1984 
and Horwich 1996 for more neutralist arguments.) At least, core commitments of scientific 
realism offer no guidance in choosing between the various substantive theories of truth and 
deflationary theories. That said, the stronger view that does find partisan views of truth within 
perspectives on the realism debate has a long history, which is the focus of the subsequent 
sections. 
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3. Partisanship: The Natural Ontological Attitude 
In discussing the history of realism, Putnam writes: “That one could have a theory of 
truth which is neutral with respect to epistemological questions, and even with respect to the 
great metaphysical issue of realism versus idealism, would have seemed preposterous to a 
nineteenth-century philosopher” (1978: 9). Indeed, the shift from idealism toward realism in the 
work of philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore in the beginning of the 
twentieth century was accompanied by their eventual adoption of the correspondence theory of 
truth. The idealism of their forerunners went hand in hand with the coherence theories of truth 
(e.g., Joachim 1906). 
That the debate over realism and idealism (in whatever domain) should have great 
implications for the theory of truth (and vice versa) is understandable when the theories of truth 
in question are loaded with metaphysical content and consequences. Not all views about the 
nature of truth are particularly metaphysical, however. Deflationary views of truth, for instance, 
offer positive views as to what the expressive functions of the truth predicate are, but remain 
silent on broader metaphysical questions such as the tenability of realism. The same holds for 
primitivist theories of truth (e.g., Asay 2013a). Nevertheless, some philosophers remain 
convinced that truth plays an indispensable role when it comes to discerning the correct 
metaphysical interpretation of science. This attitude has been developed quite thoroughly by 
Arthur Fine (1984a, 1984b, 1986). Fine, for instance, goes so far as to claim that the scientific 
realist “adopts a standard, model-theoretic, correspondence theory of truth” (1984a: 52), whereas 
the scientific anti-realist adopts a pragmatic, instrumentalist, or conventionalist theory of truth 
(1984b: 97). 
According to Fine, there is a source of common ground between the scientific realist and 
anti-realist. He calls this the “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), and defines it as the 
acceptance of scientific theories and taking “them into one’s life as true” in just the way that one 
accepts the evidence of one’s senses (1984b: 95). Where realism and anti-realism differ is in what 
sort of theory they attach to ‘true’. The realist accepts scientific theories as being 
“correspondence true”, whereas the anti-realist accepts scientific theories as being 
“instrumentally true”, or something similar. Fine’s own preference is to reject both perspectives, 
and just accept scientific theories as being true, but without adding on top of that some theory as 
to what the nature of truth consists in. 
Fine’s presentation of the debate has an appealing structure and theoretical simplicity. 
But it is not at all clear that he has accurately characterized the role that truth plays in the debates 
over scientific realism. One common reaction to Fine’s view is that he is really espousing a realist 
perspective, despite his claims to being above the debate and advocating “non-realism”. 
Consider, for instance, this passage: 
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When NOA counsels us to accept the results of science as true, I take it that we are to 
treat truth in the usual referential way, so that a sentence (or statement) is true just in 
case the entities referred to stand in the referred-to relations. Thus, NOA sanctions 
ordinary referential semantics and commits us, via truth, to the existence of the 
individuals, properties, relations, processes, and so forth referred to by the scientific 
statements that we accept as true. (1984b: 98) 
 
It is easy for a reader of Fine to find a strong commitment to scientific realism in this passage 
(e.g., Musgrave 1989), as well as a strong commitment to metaphysical realism about contentious 
entities such as properties and relations. For one thing, some correspondence theorists of truth 
might recognize their own view in this statement of Fine’s. What more is there to a 
correspondence theory of truth than a view that explicates the relationship between statements 
and the world via relations of reference? (See, e.g., Lynch 2009.) Correspondence theories come 
in a variety of forms, but at least some who carry the banner of correspondence theory are 
attracted to views like those that Fine is happy to accept. 
Furthermore, in attributing NOA to all parties to the debate, Fine mischaracterizes many 
extant positions. Fine accepts that ‘Electrons exist’, being a consequence of contemporary 
physical theories, is true, and thus he is committed to the existence of electrons, to which that 
sentence refers. That commitment is supposed to be common ground between the realist and 
anti-realist (as well as Fine’s non-realist). Yet it’s hard to imagine many scientific anti-realists 
accepting this consequence, since the motivations for their view often lie precisely in being wary 
of ontological commitments to unobservable entities such as electrons. Van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricist, for instance, refuses to believe that ‘Electrons exist’ is true; agnosticism 
is the best stance regarding statements concerning the unobservable aspects of reality, even 
though such statements may be regarded as in fact being true or false. Other views that aim to 
reinterpret scientific theories so that they are not committed to unobservable entities will 
likewise resist NOA’s plea to accept the apparent referential commitments of scientific theories. 
Hence, it appears that Fine’s attempt to define the debate over scientific realism fails to 
reflect the actual debate between realists and anti-realists. What is especially relevant for our 
purposes is that the disputes between, say, constructive empiricists and realists do not seem to 
turn at all on what theory of truth is correct. The constructive empiricist, for instance, 
recommends agnosticism regarding the truth or falsity of the parts of scientific theories that 
concern the unobservable. They thereby reject NOA, which endorses the entire truth of 
accepted scientific theories. But their agnosticism is not a function of their theory of truth; 
whatever truth itself is, constructive empiricists stay neutral as to whether what scientific theories 
say about the unobservable is true. Constructive empiricists may maintain their stance, regardless 
of whether they believe in correspondence theories of truth (to which van Fraassen seems 
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sympathetic early on: see 1980: 197), deflationary theories (to which van Fraassen is currently 
more sympathetic: see 2008: 249), or something else. It is their epistemology that drives their 
agnosticism, not their theory of truth. 
Fine’s defense of partisanship between truth and realism faces some severe difficulties. 
His view predicts that realists and anti-realists alike accept in full the findings from successful 
scientific theorizing, and that their differences emerge only after they engage in more 
philosophical debates over, for example, what the best theory of truth is. As Fine might put it, 
philosophers don’t disagree about the science itself, but rather about the best interpretation of that 
science. Fine, in turn, suggests offering no interpretation at all. In practice, this is not the debate 
that actually takes place. Theorists offer arguments about underdetermination (e.g., van Fraassen 
1980), the pessimistic induction (e.g., Laudan 1981), the explanation of scientific success (e.g., 
Smart 1963), and so on, in order to determine whether or not we should believe in the truth of 
successful scientific theories. Philosophers of science engage in arguments that assess directly the 
metaphysical and epistemological characteristics of scientific inquiry: Does the history of science 
give us reason to distrust the reliability of science as a source of truth? Are the posits of scientific 
theories metaphysically problematic? Is it epistemologically justified to infer the existence of 
objects that cannot be perceived by the senses? These questions form the heart of the debate 
over scientific realism. Concerns about the nature of truth have not been at the forefront, and 
are largely irrelevant to the arguments at hand. 
Why, then, does Fine put so much weight on the notion of truth in his account of 
scientific realism? The answer, I gather, involves the fact that Fine is responding to a 
philosophical tradition that has an inflated idea as to the kind of truth that realists have 
traditionally accepted. This conception of truth has little to do with the contemporary dialectic in 
the theory of truth, which often involves the debate between deflationary theories and 
contemporary correspondence theories. But it is a notion that has been of importance 
historically, especially in the mid-century metaphysical debates carried out by seminal figures 
such as Kuhn, Rorty, and Putnam. 
 
4. Partisanship: Kuhn, Rorty, and Putnam 
Kuhn’s work on the history of scientific revolutions is often thought to have radical 
consequences for the very idea of truth, and whether scientific theories are in the business of 
pursuing it. On Kuhn’s view, the theories generated by scientists working in different paradigms 
are incommensurable; they speak, in effect, different languages. As a result, there is no sense to 
be made of progress from one scientific paradigm to another, at least by way of being measured 
by their attempts to capture a true, shared picture of reality. The very idea of a shared reality, a 
single world described more or less accurately by successive scientific theories, is something that 
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Kuhn finds objectionable. Instead of claiming that scientists from different paradigms pursue 
their investigations with different worldviews, Kuhn prefers to say that “after a revolution 
scientists work in a different world” (1970: 135). (See also H. Sankey, “Kuhn, relativism and 
realism,” ch. 6 of this volume.) 
The notion of truth plays very little role in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, as Kuhn 
himself notes (1970: 170). This absence is expected, given Kuhn’s skepticism about the role of 
truth in science. In the postscript to the second edition, Kuhn puts forward his fairly dismissive 
attitude about the role of truth in science: 
 
A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors not only in the sense 
that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles but also because it is 
somehow a better representation of what nature is really like. One often hears that 
successive theories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and more closely to, the 
truth. Apparently generalizations like that refer not to the puzzle-solutions and the 
concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to its ontology, to the match, that 
is, between the entities with which the theory populates nature and what is “really there.” 
 
Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of ‘truth’ for application to 
whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to 
reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between the ontology of a 
theory and its “real” counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle. (1970: 
206) 
 
What we can learn from this passage is how Kuhn understands his realist opponent. When a 
realist claims that a theory is true, what Kuhn hears is that the theory, in a theory-independent 
way, matches what is “really there”. The scare quotes here are revealing. They suggest that the 
anti-Kuhnian uses those words in a way that Kuhn does not. Presumably, the realist has some 
inflated notion of ‘really there’ of which Kuhn is skeptical. Perhaps Kuhn’s idea is that the realist 
thinks that there is some privileged description of the universe, and that a theory that fails to 
employ its terms fails to be true, despite whatever predictive successes it may enjoy. (Nowhere 
else in the book does Kuhn use the phrase ‘theory-independent’.) If so, for Kuhn truth is 
essentially connected with some special vocabulary that provides the correct description of 
reality, whereas scientific theories are always “dependent” upon their own vocabularies which 
may or may not correspond to the privileged one. 
To better appreciate the perspective Kuhn is endorsing, it will be worthwhile to consider 
the views of others who also approve of the general idea. Kuhn’s claim seems to be that realism 
is committed to theories being “really” true in a “theory-independent” way. Such a commitment 
8 
 
is too metaphysically loaded for Kuhn’s tastes. Fine echoes this thought when he describes the 
realist as one who adds onto NOA “a desk-thumping, foot-stamping shout of “Really!” [… T]he 
realist wants to explain the robust sense in which he takes these claims to truth or existence, 
namely, as claims about reality – what is really, really the case” (1984b: 97). It might seem 
juvenile to joke as to whether Fine intends the realist position to be one that takes scientific 
theories to be really true, or one that takes scientific theories to be really, really true. But the joke 
has some force, since Fine crucially relies on the distinction between a theory being true and a 
theory being really true in order to separate his view from realism (much as Kuhn relies on 
distinguishing objects existing from their “really” existing). The question is what the difference is 
supposed to be. Fine again points to the correspondence theory of truth as the culprit. Though 
Fine personally takes the correspondence theory to be empty of content – it is “an arresting 
foot-thump and, logically speaking, of no more force” (1984b: 97) – it at least provides the 
needed wedge between realism on the one hand and Kuhn and Fine on the other. 
The same dichotomy drawn by Kuhn and Fine also appears in the work of Richard Rorty 
(1972). He, too, draws a distinction between the way the realist understands truth and the world, 
and the way that the realists’ opponent understands those notions. When discussing the idea that 
the world determines what is true and false (as opposed to a coherentist view that says truth is 
matter of coherence between beliefs, say), Rorty identifies an ambiguity. He writes: “All that 
“determination” comes to is that our belief that snow is white is true because snow is white, that 
our beliefs about the stars are true because of the way the stars are laid out, and so on” (1972: 
662). This set of claims is unimpeachable, much as (on Fine’s view) the commitments of NOA 
are. But, Rorty says, this sense of determination is not enough for the realist: “What he wants is 
[…] the notion of a world so “independent of our knowledge” that it might, for all we know, 
prove to contain none of the things we have always thought we were talking about” (1972: 662-
663). What is clear is that Rorty, like the others, portrays the realist as someone thirsting after 
something always elusive. For Rorty, what is distinctive about realist truth is that it could obtain 
in spite of everything we believe about the world being wrong. What appears to concern Rorty is 
the possibility (according to realism) that a scientific theory could manifest any number of 
empirical and practical virtues, and yet somehow fail to be true (perhaps because it fails to be 
couched in some privileged vocabulary). 
Common among Fine, Kuhn, and Rorty is the idea that essential to scientific realism is a 
doctrine about truth that maintains that it “really” corresponds to the world, is “independent” of 
theory, and that we could in principle be wrong about it. The difficulty with pressing this line, 
however, is that it risks making a strawman out of the realist. After all, notice that Fine accepts 
that theories are true, Kuhn admits that scientific theories aim at making correct predictions, and 
Rorty believes that the world determines what is true. These sound like the sorts of views that 
realists espouse: science aims at telling a true (and not merely useful) story about the world, and 
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it is the world itself (and not our beliefs and practices) that decides which theories are true or 
false. In order to distance themselves from the realists, Kuhn, Rorty, and Fine insert extra 
content into the realist view – theories aren’t just true, they’re really true – but at the same time 
they seem to suggest that this additional content isn’t really additional content at all. A stomp of 
the foot does not add cognitive content to an utterance. That’s what Fine would say, but then it’s 
unclear why Fine thinks it’s a stomp of the foot that separates his philosophical view from the 
realist’s. The concern, ultimately, is that either these supposedly non-realist or anti-realist stances 
adopted by Kuhn, Fine, and Rorty are just realist perspectives after all, or that these theorists 
have unfairly mischaracterized the realist position. 
Realists, it seems to me, have more than adequate responses to make against each of 
these critiques. The realist may claim that Fine’s “real truth” is nothing more than truth, and so 
Fine needs to do more to successfully distance himself from realism. Kuhn’s idea of “theory 
independent truth” needs some analysis that doesn’t render the idea innocuous. For example, 
‘Kuhn is the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ is true, even though some theory T1 
entails it, and some theory T2 entails its negation. Kuhn is the author of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions regardless of what any theory has to say about the matter. That is a sense of theory-
independent truth the realist is quick to accept; if the realist is committed to some other notion 
(such as a privileged vocabulary that is indispensable for describing the “real” nature of reality), it 
had better be identified and explained. As for Rorty, the realist sees nothing more than a sensible 
epistemological fallibilism where Rorty detects grand metaphysical substance. That we might be 
wrong about even our most successful theories remains a possibility, however remote. The 
sensible realist will claim that we’re not in fact wrong about the theory of evolution by natural 
selection, for example, but that in principle we could be mistaken about it: the evidence against 
the theory could forever lie beyond our ken. This unfortunate possibility is far-fetched, but a 
modest fallibilist epistemology acknowledges it. Rorty is mistaken to see inflated metaphysics 
lurking behind it. 
Hilary Putnam, for his part, has articulated a similar mindset that attempts to insert a gulf 
between realists and anti-realists. He writes: “What I believe is that there is a notion of truth, or, 
more humbly, of being “right,” which we use constantly and which is not at all the metaphysical 
realist’s notion of a description which “corresponds” to the noumenal facts” (1990: 40). First 
notice Putnam’s reluctance to even speak about truth: it’s more humble to speak of being right, 
and avoid appeal to ‘truth’ at all. Given the contemporary context in the theory of truth, this 
supposed humility is uncalled for. To speak of something being true need not amount to 
anything more than making an assertion. When I assert that it’s true that Kuhn authored The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions I’m only asserting that Kuhn authored The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. To think that the use of ‘truth’ requires any metaphysical apology is to assume from 
the outset that the notion is inflated. Second, we see again the common refrain that the realist is 
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committed to a kind of truth that goes beyond what Putnam can accept in good conscience. 
Putnam invokes Kant’s phenomena/noumena distinction, which is a clue as to what Kuhn, Fine, 
and Rorty may also suspect is distinctive about realism. Non-realists, they say, can accept that 
truth is correspondence to reality in some sense, but not in the distinctly realist sense of truth as 
correspondence to noumenal reality (or the “World”, as Fine (1986) writes with italics and a capital 
‘w’). 
I am skeptical that scientific realists rely on this Kantian distinction in developing their 
view (see also Musgrave 1989). The distinction plays no role in Psillos’s defense of realism, and 
for all of van Fraassen’s talk of “saving the phenomena”, The Scientific Image never once discusses 
the noumena. Perhaps, though, there is a way of articulating the basic thought around which 
Putnam and the others seem to be circling, drawing on the idea of a “privileged language” from 
above. Imagine that there is some language – distinct from any extant natural language – that 
“carves nature at the joints”. That is to say, all of the predicates of this language refer to the 
genuine, natural properties of the world (as opposed to gerrymandered properties like grue). The 
other features of the language – its quantifiers and connectives, for example – also map onto the 
genuine structure of the world. This language may be used to describe the world “as it really is”, 
in a way that our humble natural languages that are overly concerned with the more derivative 
parts of reality never could. This is the language of God, or the language of “the book of the 
world”. Facts expressed in this language are the noumenal facts. Sure, it’s true that Kuhn 
authored The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. But presumably, that claim reduces down to some 
complicated set of facts of microphysics that can be expressed using the privileged language: 
those are the really true facts, the ones about quarks and charms, not about men and 
monographs. That there is such a description of the world, and that science aims at it, is the 
distinctive commitment of realism. 
If this sort of picture is what the partisan opponents have in mind when they speak of 
“real”, “theory independent”, or “noumenal” truth, I again wonder on behalf of scientific realists 
as to whether this is a necessary component of the latter’s view. To be sure, the account has its 
defenders, Ted Sider (2011) being a prominent recent example. Yet it is hardly necessary for 
articulating the kind of perspective on science that realists usually defend. The joint-carving view 
is a broader metaphysical perspective one might have, but it’s one that reaches far beyond the 
interests of the scientific realism debates and extends into the canonical discussions about 
metaphysics, empiricism, transcendental idealism, and the like. These are perennial philosophical 
topics of great interest, but to see them as essential to capturing the basic perspective of the 
scientific realist is to inflate the view beyond what’s warranted. The partisans, it seems, are 
guiltier of inflating scientific realism than are realists of inflating truth. 
Summing up, the defenders of the partisan perspective on truth and realism – at least 
those coming to the issue from the non-realist camp – assign to scientific realism a conception 
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of truth that is thoroughly metaphysical and involves a commitment to views that speak to a host 
of grand philosophical questions such as the tenability of transcendental idealism and the like. 
The non-realists appear to take this tack because it allows them to embrace the truth of scientific 
theories while disavowing the realist position: Yes, scientific theories are true of course. What 
means do we have of discovering the truth about the world better than science? But whether or 
not they’re “really true” or describe “the World” in all its noumenal glory are questions that either 
escape our grasp, are empty, or don’t even make sense. What’s revealing about this conception 
of the debate is that it’s coming from the non-realist camp; as a result, we should be wary of 
thinking that they have correctly described their opponents’ positions. When the only option you 
leave open to your opposition is that their view is meaningless, empty, or entails skepticism, 
there is cause for re-evaluation, and concern that you have erected a strawman. 
In the face of this sort of realist retort – ordinary truth itself is the realist’s standard for 
science, not “joint carving in the language of God noumenal truth” – the partisan opponents 
worry that realism is reduced to triviality or banality (cf. Rorty 1986: 354 and Putnam 1990: 32). 
Who would deny that scientific theories are true (even if they’re not a source of God’s-eye 
perspective truth)? Well, plenty of those deeply engaged in the realism debate. Worrall (1989) 
doubts science’s ability to teach us the truth about the nature of light. Van Fraassen believes that 
scientific investigation gives us no evidence as to the existence of DNA molecules and electrons 
(1980). Laudan argues that the history of science shows that we ought to be skeptical about even 
the best of our current theories (1981). None of these views accepts that we should blithely 
commit to the truth of our best science; furthermore, they do this independently of offering 
philosophically loaded conceptions of truth. If committing to the truth of theories automatically 
involved such an inflated (or at least highly controversial) metaphysical worldview, then there 
would be independent reason to pause before accepting the truth of our best science. But what 
the actual practitioners in the philosophy of science demonstrate is that even if we commit to a 
fully deflationary conception of truth, there is still reason to be cautious about accepting the truth 
of scientific theories. Truth – even when brought back down to earth from noumenal heaven – 
is still a major commitment, and one to which many philosophers of science object. If the non-
realist partisans are happy to commit to it nonetheless, that highly suggests that they should be 
interpreted as reluctant realists. 
 
5. Modest Partisanship 
The partisan views discussed above have all come from those who reject the label of 
scientific realism. In effect, I have argued that their criticisms are better directed at those who, 
like Sider, embrace a particularly loaded (i.e., joint-carving) broader metaphysical outlook. 
Defenders of scientific realism endorse a more modest thesis that need not take a stand on some 
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of the grander philosophical questions of metaphysics. In this section, I address some more 
contemporary perspectives on truth and realism that don’t infuse the issue with such imposing 
philosophical implications, and yet still find a substantive role for truth to play in the 
understanding of science and its success. 
Philip Kitcher (2002) has defended what he calls a “modest correspondence theory of 
truth”, which he more or less equates with the basic commitment of scientific realism (or at least 
his brand of realism). Kitcher’s modest theory “doesn’t suppose that there are entities, facts, to 
which true sentences correspond” (2002: 347). Nor, presumably, does Kitcher’s realist employ 
the even grander metaphysical theses adumbrated by the partisans of the previous sections. 
Kitcher’s positive account of truth maintains that truths are about objects that exist 
independently of those who make utterances concerning them, and that a causal theory of 
reference is required to explain how linguistic tokens represent mind-independent objects. It is 
the second of these commitments that Kitcher believes separates his modest realist and 
correspondence theorist from the deflationist. The adoption of this causal theory of reference is 
useful to the realist because it buttresses the classic realist argument that truth offers the best 
explanation of ordinary and scientific success, both practical and theoretical. Truth can explain 
success because a theory being true means that there are causal connections between how the 
world is and how the theory represents the world. Maps, by analogy, are successful when they 
stand in the right causal relationships to the part of the world that they claim to model. 
All told, Kitcher identifies scientific realism as the view that many of the well-established 
claims made by science are true in the sense offered by his modest correspondence theory of 
truth. There is reason to adopt realism in this sense because the kind of truth (and, importantly, 
reference) posited by the view is essential for explaining the many successes of mature science. 
Here we find a kind of partisanship – which theory of truth you maintain makes a difference as 
to what view on realism is most tenable – albeit one that is not so burdened with the 
metaphysical extravagances of the past. Still, Kitcher’s presentation faces its own challenges. 
Notably, Kitcher defines deflationism about truth in terms of a thesis about reference: that all there 
is to say about reference are sentences of the form ‘‘a’ refers to a, if a exists’. This thesis is best 
thought of as a deflationary view about reference, and so is separable from deflationary views 
about truth. It’s true that Paul Horwich (perhaps the most ardent defender of deflationism) 
endorses both (1990: 121), but that is not to say that the two views are the same, or that one 
entails the other. For example, one might adopt a causal story about how ‘Kuhn’ has come to 
refer to Kuhn, and how ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ has come to refer to The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. The proponent of that account about reference could still maintain that there 
is no substantial property in virtue of which ‘Kuhn is the author of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions’ is true. There is nothing more to the sentence being true than Kuhn being the author 
of the book. The upshot for Kitcher is that while realism might be aided by a partisan view on 
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reference, truth ultimately has nothing to do with it. 
Other modest takes on partisanship might, like Kitcher’s, try to find some room for how 
the theory of truth can lead to progress in the discussion of scientific realism. Stephen Leeds 
(2007) considers (and rejects) some possible avenues down which realists might venture. His 
view, with which I am sympathetic, is that deflationary views are perfectly sufficient for the tasks 
scientific realists take up. To defend partisanship, theorists need to come up with some task for a 
substantive theory of truth to perform that deflationism cannot handle. See, for instance, Jarrett 
Leplin’s argument for why a deflationary “redundancy” theory can’t capture the necessary 
explanatory import of truth needed for realism (1997: 17-19). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The central questions about the relationship between truth and realism are (1) does truth 
figure into the definition of scientific realism, and (2) are particular views about truth necessary to 
the debate over scientific realism? I have suggested a positive answer to the first question, and 
presented a number of difficulties for positive answers to the second. Crucial to the realist 
position is that science succeeds (or aims to succeed) at discovering the (approximate) truth 
about reality, though it may be indifferent as to whether the correct theory of truth is offered by 
correspondence or deflationary theories. Whether realism is exhausted by its relationship to truth 
is another matter. I have argued elsewhere, for instance, that realists need to commit not just to 
the (approximate) truth of scientific theories, but also to some sort of mind-independent reality 
of unobservable objects that grounds the truth of scientific theories (Asay 2013b). Otherwise, a 
phenomenalist view that accepts that scientific theories are true, but made true exclusively by a 
realm of sense data would qualify as a realist theory. (Van Fraassen speaks to such concerns by 
requiring that theories be literally true, but I take the issue to be a metaphysical one, not a 
semantic one.) 
Given the sheer number of different theories that have been defended in the name of 
scientific realism, the correspondence theory of truth, and others, it is inevitable that some 
theorists will develop theories about realism and truth that are necessarily connected; Kitcher 
provides just one example. Nevertheless, it remains plausible that though truth and realism are 
intimately connected, realism need not adopt a stance on what exactly truth is. That may come as 
a shock to those with nineteenth-century sensibilities, but times have changed. And for the 
better: neutrality is the preferred view, methodologically speaking, as it allows us to develop 
views with little risk of begging the question against other, potentially quite different views on 
other, distinct matters. 
 
 
14 
 
References 
Asay, J. (2013a) The Primitivist Theory of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
—— (2013b) “Three paradigms of scientific realism: a truthmaking account,” International Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science 27, 1-21. 
Cartwright, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Devitt, M. (1984) Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fine, A. (1984a) “And not anti-realism either,” Noûs 18, 51-65. 
—— (1984b) “The natural ontological attitude,” in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, pp. 83-107. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
—— (1986) “Unnatural attitudes: realist and instrumentalist attachments to science,” Mind 95, 
149-179. 
Horwich, P. (1990) Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
—— (1996) “Realism and truth,” Philosophical Perspectives 10, 187-197. 
Joachim, H. H. (1906) The Nature of Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kitcher, P. (2002) “On the explanatory role of correspondence truth,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 64, 346-364. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Laudan, L. (1981) “A confutation of convergent realism,” Philosophy of Science 48, 19-49. 
Leeds, S. (2007) “Correspondence truth and scientific realism,” Synthese 159, 1-21. 
Leplin, J. (1997) A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lynch, M. P. (2009) Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Musgrave, A. (1989) “NOA’s ark—Fine for realism,” Philosophical Quarterly 39, 383-398. 
Newman, A. (2002) The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Psillos, S. (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge. 
Putnam, H. (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
—— (1990) A defense of internal realism. In his Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant, 
pp. 30-42. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1972) “The world well lost,” Journal of Philosophy 69, 649-665. 
—— (1986) “Pragmatism, Davidson and truth,” in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, pp. 333-55. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Sider, T. (2011) Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Smart, J. J. C. (1963) Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
—— (1968) Between Science and Philosophy. New York: Random House. 
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980) The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
15 
 
—— (2008) Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Worrall, J. (1989) “Structural realism: the best of both worlds?”, Dialectica 43, 99-124. 
Young, J. O. (2001) “A defence of the coherence theory of truth,” Journal of Philosophical Research 
26, 89-101. 
 
 
